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The Statutes of Iona: The Archipelagic Context
Alison Cathcart
In recent decades, understanding of the historical development of Britainand Ireland has benefited significantly from the adoption of integrated ap-proaches to the history of Britain and Ireland. While traditional national
histories laid the foundation, the new British and Irish historiography has teased
out many of the nuances arising from the interaction between the three kingdoms
or four nations of Britain and Ireland. This approach has produced much scholarly
work for both the medieval and early modern periods, although modern historians
are still grappling with attempts to write a genuinely British history.1 For the early
modern period in particular, the “three kingdoms” debate of the seventeenth
century has advanced awareness of the complexity of regal union and the problems
associated with one king ruling three distinct kingdoms. It is within this wider
British context that James VI and I’s efforts to integrate his three kingdoms need
to be viewed. Although James’s “earnist dispositioun to perfyte that Union”—
brought about by his succession to the English throne on 1603—was thwarted
by both the English and Scottish parliaments, James could not afford to govern
either kingdom in isolation.2 More so perhaps than many of his advisors, the king
Alison Cathcart is lecturer in history at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Her current research
focuses primarily on links between Scotland and Ireland within a wider archipelagic context throughout
the sixteenth century. The author would like to thank Aonghas MacCoinnich, Allan Macinnes, and
Roger Mason for their suggestions on earlier drafts, as well as Anna Clark and two anonymous reviewers
for their constructive comments, which improved this article significantly.
1 Norman Davies, The Isles: A History (London, 1999); R. R. Davies, The First English Empire: Power
and Identities in the British Isles, 1093–1343 (Oxford, 2000); Robin Frame, The Political Development
of the British Isles, 1100–1400 (Oxford, 1990); Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill, The British Problem
c. 1534–1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago (Basingstoke, 1996); Steven G. Ellis and
Sarah Barber, eds., Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485–1725 (London, 1995); Nich-
olas Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580–1650 (Oxford, 2001); Allan I. Macinnes, The British Rev-
olution, 1629–1660 (Basingstoke, 2005); Keith Robbins, “Historians and Twentieth-Century British
History, 1983–2008,” unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Modern British History,
University of Strathclyde, 24 June 2008.
2 Letter from the Edinburgh Council to James, 3 March 1607, in The Register of the Privy Council
of Scotland, A.D. 1545–1625 (RPCS), ed. John Hill Burton and David Masson, first series, 10 vols.
(Edinburgh, 1877–98), 7:513. The Scots did not reject union outright but were glad that the English
rejection meant they no longer had to offer lukewarm support to James’s proposal.
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was acutely aware of how policies implemented in one realm would have an impact
elsewhere. This is evident in his government of the troublesome parts of his king-
doms, primarily the Gaelic regions of Ireland and Scotland, but also along the
Anglo-Scottish border.
In his efforts to extend his royal authority throughout Britain and Ireland, James
developed his policy for reforming “barbarous” subjects. This “civilizing” policy
had taken shape during James’s kingship of Scotland when, in the 1580s and
1590s, the king pursued a number of initiatives aimed at bringing law and order
to the western Highlands and Isles.3 While there have been some moves to analyze
James’s policy toward his barbarous subjects within a wider archipelagic context,
this approach has not been adopted by many Scottish historians.4 Indeed, discus-
sion of James’s policy toward the Scottish Highlands and Isles after 1603 makes
little reference to external influences. James’s plans for civilizing the western High-
lands and Isles may have begun while he was king of Scotland, but from 1603
onward James VI was king of three kingdoms, not one.
This article places James’s Highland policy, and more specifically the Statutes
of Iona, within a “British” or archipelagic context, which I argue is crucial to
understanding the statutes in terms of Stuart policy toward its more remote
regions. The Statutes of Iona of 1609 resulted from negotiations between James
VI and the Highland elite and made provision for the improvement of the state
of the church in the Highlands; restricted aspects of Gaelic society that were a
drain on economic resources but implemented efforts to increase the general
standard of living; included measures to educate the eldest sons of clan chiefs in
schools in the Lowlands; and, finally, restricted military aspects of clan society.
The statutes have been regarded for some time as a key part of James’s scheme
for civilizing his Highland subjects and extending law and order throughout the
region. This is due, largely, to the work of Donald Gregory who, writing in 1836,
attached “major historical significance” to “the Statutes of Icolmkill.”5
In recent decades, a number of historians have reassessed Gregory’s interpre-
tation of the statutes. From a constitutional perspective, Maurice Lee argued that
3 Act of Parliament “For the quieting and keeping in obedience of the disorderit subjectis inhabitantis
of the bordouris hielandis and ilis,” 29 July 1587, in Acts of the Parliament of Scotland (APS), ed. T.
Thomson and C. Innes, 12 vols. (Edinburgh, 1814–75), 3:461–66. This act aimed at controlling the
Highlands and the Border region of southern Scotland. The Border region had been regarded as lawless
for some time, and policies previously adopted there were utilized in the Highlands as well. The 1587
act also made a distinction between the west Highlands and Isles and the central and eastern Highlands.
While some reference will be made to the Borders, this article will concentrate on the west Highlands
and Isles. For further discussion of the central and eastern Highlands, see Alison Cathcart, Kinship and
Clientage: Highland Clanship, 1451 to 1609 (Leiden, 2006). Although the civilizing policy was extended
to the northern Isles, they will not form part of this study. As argued by Macinnes (British Revolution,
40, 61–62), the annexation of Orkney and Shetland was concerned primarily with James’s integration
of the British seas into his ius imperium.
4 Jane H. Ohlmeyer, “‘Civilizinge of those rude parts’: Colonisation within Britain and Ireland,
1580s–1640s,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 1, The Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas
Canny (Oxford, 1998), 124–47; Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart,
1603–1788 (East Linton, 1996); Jane E. A. Dawson, The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary Queen
of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and the Struggle for Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, 2002).
5 Donald Gregory, The History of the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland, from A.D. 1493 to
A.D. 1625 (Edinburgh, 1836; repr. 2008), 330–33; Martin MacGregor, “The Statutes of Iona: Text
and Context,” Innes Review 57, no. 2 (Autumn 2006): 111.
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their significance has been overstated. Julian Goodare asserted that the statutes
were “incomplete, incoherent, illogical and paradoxical.” Within wider British and
imperial contexts, David Armitage regarded the statutes as part of the development
of seventeenth-century colonial theory in Scotland, while Allan Macinnes inter-
preted the statutes as an attempt to integrate the Highlands into wider Scottish
society.6 Martin MacGregor agreed with Macinnes’s conclusions, asserting the
“radicalism—or realism” of the statutes and their implications for clan society. In
short, the shift toward modernism resulted when the Highland elite shifted away
from their traditional function of clan chiefs and accepted new political, economic,
and legal realities rather than as a response to legislation issued from the center.7
Ultimately, however, MacGregor challenged Goodare’s conclusion that “the Stat-
utes were a poor piece of policy which were consequently marginalized.”8
MacGregor’s argument was based on a detailed analysis of the text of the statutes,
highlighting the need for historians to go back to the original sources. In doing
so, MacGregor pointed out what he considered to be the inconsistencies in Goo-
dare’s interpretation, arguing overall that the statutes represented an important
achievement in royal policy toward the Highlands. Although MacGregor sought
to focus on both “text and context,” much of his argument related to text and,
in comparison, the argument regarding context is limited.9 In taking MacGregor’s
recent article as my starting point, I do not disagree with its main conclusions.
Rather in what follows I seek to elucidate a significant gap in MacGregor’s work
by placing the Statutes of Iona in a wider context, highlighting how an appreciation
of the archipelagic situation can inform understanding of the Scottish situation.
THE SITUATION IN SCOTLAND
In order to understand the archipelagic context fully and, consequently, where the
statutes sit in relation to the Plantation of Ulster, which also began in 1609, it is
important to return to the 1580s and 1590s and the formulation of James VI’s
civilizing policy for Scottish Gaeldom. From the moment James VI began his
personal rule in Scotland in the mid-1580s, he sought to bring the Highlands and
Isles to order by initiating a number of policies intended to “civilize” the inhab-
itants of the western Highlands and Isles.10 On occasion these efforts met with
6 Maurice Lee, Government by Pen: Scotland under James VI and I (Urbana, IL, 1980), 75–82,
136–47; Julian Goodare, “The Statutes of Iona in Context,” Scottish Historical Review 77, no. 203
(April 1998): 31–57; David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000),
55–58; Macinnes, Clanship, 56–87.
7 Macinnes, Clanship, ix; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 156–57. See also David Stevenson,
Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 1980), 20–31; Maurice Lee,
“The Government of Scotland after 1603,” Scottish Historical Review 55, no. 159 (1976): 41–53,
reprinted in The “Inevitable” Union, ed. Maurice Lee (East Linton, 2003), 133–44; Michael Lynch,
“James VI and the ‘Highland Problem,’” in The Reign of James VI, ed. Julian Goodare and Michael
Lynch (East Linton, 2000), 208–27.
8 MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 112–13.
9 Ibid, 113. MacGregor acknowledges the need for greater contextualization.
10 Recent interpretations of James VI’s Highland policy have viewed them from a state-formation
perspective. In reality, James’s policies, including naval expeditions to the Isles (most of which were
abandoned due to cost), extracting promises of good behavior from the Highlanders known as surety
and caution, royal favor for those who cooperated with the crown and forfeiture for those who con-
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success; in the late 1580s and 1590s, various Highland chiefs submitted and gave
assurances for their good behavior. Unfortunately for James, these submissions
were tenuous; lawlessness and blatant flouting of royal authority remained the rule
rather than the exception.11 What was needed was a more systematic, far-reaching
policy, subsequently to be expressed in James’s civilizing of the region that aimed
at “reducing . . . the rebellious inhabitants thairof to obedience . . . establishing
of peace, justice and quietnes,” transforming the barbarous nature of the High-
landers, stimulating commercial development, increasing crown revenue, and,
thereby, integrating the region fully into Scottish society. Such policies were
wrapped up in the rhetoric of religion, law, and order, designed to appeal to
Lowland society where many were reluctant to support the king’s expeditions to
the west.12
By the late 1590s with the civilizing of the Highland Gaels under way, James
was fluctuating between various policies, including plantation. In his advice to his
son Henry, Basilicon Doron, published in 1598, James discussed the Highland
problem and the best way to deal with the situation. Here James asserted that his
plan for the Highlanders was to plant “Colonies among them of answerable In-
lands subiects that within short time may reforme and ciuilize the best inclined
among them; rooting out or transporting the barbarous and stubborne sort, and
planting ciuilitie in their rooms.”13 The introduction of a plantation policy was a
reaction to ongoing lawlessness in the west Highlands and the failure of previous
efforts to extend law and order throughout the region. Initial efforts to plant the
west Highlands and Isles had begun earlier in 1596 when Angus MacDonald of
Clan Donald South submitted in writing to the king.14 MacDonald agreed to hand
over his eldest son James as a hostage, to “remove himself, his family and depen-
ders, and all others who are not actual tenants or possessors of the ground, out
sistently rebelled, were little more than a sophisticated repeat of the policies adopted by his grandfather
and great-grandfather, James V and James IV, respectively. Indeed James may well have taken note of
Lindsay of Pitscottie’s account of the policy of James V which “brocht the yllis . . . in goode ruell”;
Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie, The History and Chronicles of Scotland. From the Slauchter of King James
the First to the Ane Thousande fyve hundreith thrie scoir fyftein zeir, ed., Æ. J. G. Mackay, 3 vols.
(Edinburgh, 1899–1911), 1:352.
11 Since, arguably, the fourteenth century, the “Highlands” had been regarded increasingly as a region
lacking in law and order where the crown’s authority was repeatedly ignored. What the crown, and
most of Lowland society, failed to appreciate was the economic situation which produced high levels
of petty tit-for-tat raiding in the region. Combined with ever-increasing competition over land this
unrest confirmed the view of the Highlands as a “lawless” region. By the time James VI succeeded to
the Scottish throne, these assumptions were accepted without question.
12 King and Council commission against Lewis, 18 July 1605, RPCS, 7:87–88; Letter from James
to the Edinburgh Council, 9 May 1608, RPCS, 8:502. James wrote from Whitehall to the council in
Edinburgh acknowledging discontent on the part of some who were charged to assist the planned
expedition to the Isles. The king reiterated the command that they were to assemble, arguing that the
venture was “so necessarie to oure service and so beneficiall to that hole Estate.”
13 James VI and I, Basilicon Doron, in King James VI and I: Political Writings, ed. Johann P.
Sommerville (Cambridge, 1994), 24. This reference to plantation is an indication of James’s archipelagic
awareness, drawing on Irish precedents to be applied within a Scottish context. Also it may have been
a rather self-conscious attempt to show an English audience that he was capable of dealing effectively
with the Irish situation. This was crucial in light of the backdrop of Hugh O’Neill’s rebellion of the
1590s.
14 Otherwise known as the MacDonalds of Dunivaig. In 1589 they had separated from the
MacDonalds of the Glens, the Irish branch of the family that became known as the MacDonnells.
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of the bounds of Kintyre and isle of Giga,” and accept new crown tenants, notably
in Islay and Kintyre, the traditional patrimony of his clan. Although this plan was
never implemented, it was not long before the policy of plantation was extended
to other parts of the region, albeit with a significant departure.15
The plans for Islay, Kintyre, and Gigha had involved the Hebridean chiefs, but
future plans would involve outsiders, effectively supplanting the traditional elite.
Foundations were laid through the 1597 Act of Parliament, which required all
landowners to appear before the council and show titles to land they inhabited;
plans for the plantation of Lewis soon followed. Torquil MacLeod, chief of the
MacLeods of Lewis, was forfeited on account of his failure to produce the required
documentation. The lands of Lewis, Ronalewis, the Shiant Islands, and Troutter-
nish in Skye reverted to the crown, theoretically leaving the way clear for James
to implant “civilized,” that is, God-fearing, rent-paying, obedient Lowland subjects
into the Highland region.16 In doing so, James hoped that the barbarous inhab-
itants would become imbued with Lowland values and behavior, resulting in the
Highlanders becoming fully assimilated into the Scottish realm. However, there
had been little anticipation of the level of opposition the planters would face from
the inhabitants of Lewis, and the first attempt ended in 1601 with the planters
either meeting their death at the hands of the islanders or fleeing back to the safety
of Fife.17 These initial setbacks did little to alter the king’s mind, or indeed the
minds of the adventurers. After all, there had been a degree of opposition and
resentment to all efforts by the crown to intervene in Highland affairs, but those
involved believed this could be overcome. Consequently, a second attempt began
in August 1604.18
By this time, James VI, no longer resident in Edinburgh, was managing the
affairs of his three kingdoms from Westminster. In 1603, James had inherited not
just the thrones of England and Ireland but also the law-and-order problem that
15 Angus MacDonald’s letter of submission to James, 8 October 1596, RPCS, 6:24–25; Offers made
by MacDonald of Knockrinsay to James, 6 September 1599, RPCS, 5:321; Donald Gregory, History
of the Western Highlands, 268–74. Angus had sent his son James to court to make his submission.
Although James was detained as a hostage for his father, Angus did not fulfill any other of the conditions;
Gregory, History of the Western Highlands, 267–79, 272–74, 280–84, 287–90.
16 Act of Parliament “The inhabitantis of the iles and helandis Suld schwa thair haldingis,” 16 De-
cember 1597, APS, 4:138–39; Act of Parliament “Ratificatioun of the contract of the Lewis,” 29 June
1598, APS, 4:160–64; Certain councilors nominated to deal with matters concerning the Isles, 4 May
1598, RPCS, 5:455; Ratification of the contract concerning the island of Lewis, 29 June 1598, RPCS,
5:462–63; Gregory, History of the Western Highlands, 276–77, 279. Lewis would be the only region
planted.
17 This is quite remarkable considering the unrest that resulted from disputes over land possession
in the Highlands. At the same time, James was well aware of the military capabilities of his Highland
subjects, many of whom had considerable experience of warfare in Ireland. It suggests either a severe
underestimation of opposition to this policy or utter contempt for the inhabitants of the region.
18 Proclamation for musters for recovery of island of Lewis, 19 July 1602, RPCS, 6:420–22; Caution
for the portioners of Lewis, 8 March 1603, RPCS, 6:545–46; Act in favor of the gentlemen of Lewis,
8 March 1603, RPCS, 6:546. As early as July 1602, James issued proclamations regarding an attempt
to regain Lewis while also commenting how those involved in the first plantation were trying to shirk
their responsibilities.
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existed in Ireland, most notably in the north.19 As king of Scotland he had been
all too aware of how events in one realm could have repercussions elsewhere.
Although he was now in London, the situation in Scotland warranted his attention.
Aware that lawlessness in Scotland had the potential to spill over into Ireland, and
vice versa, while heightening unease at the English court, James stated “that it
cannot stand with his Hienes honour and princely dignitie that sic a infamous byke
of lawles lymmaris salbe sufferit in ony pairt of his Majesties dominions.”20 Con-
sequently, in February 1605 the king wrote from London to the three estates in
Scotland encouraging the promotion of royal policy and, turning his attention to
the Isles, expressed his hope that they “may be reduceit to oure obedyence, coloneis
of civile and industrious people planted thair,” whereby barbarity and poverty
would be stamped out, while trade and profit would increase.
Ongoing opposition to crown policy from the inhabitants of the Isles was per-
ceived in London as evidence of the need for rigorous implementation of plan-
tation. Consequently, on 18 July 1605 James asserted that “the interpryse of the
conques of Lewis . . . sal be yit prosequuted . . . in a mair substantious maner
nor it wes befoir, as alswa that the haill remanent Ilis and lands nixt adjacent quha
are now disobedient sal be reducit to his Hienes obedience.”21 A commission of
lieutenancy in the western Isles and Kintyre was granted to David Murray, Lord
Scone, on 8 August 1605 to undertake an expedition to the region for “the
furtherance and advancement of His Majesteis authoritie and service,” although
the commission itself gave Scone very few powers. A warrant was issued for Angus
MacDonald of Clan Donald South and other chiefs in the western Highlands and
Isles to appear before Lord Scone in Kintyre and render their castles to crown
forces, but the expedition achieved little. It was almost a year later before Scone
gave an account of his visit to the west, which had resulted in the submission of
only one chief, Angus MacDonald, who nonetheless promised to pay his rents for
Kintyre and Islay. This refusal by Highland chiefs to submit to James’s royal
authority, compounded by the situation in Lewis, was “a matter twitching His
Hienes in honour.” Indeed, as he had declared to the three estates in Scotland
the previous year, bringing the Isles to order would benefit the whole nation
19 For centuries Scots had been migrating to and settling in the north of Ireland and throughout
the sixteenth century remained the proverbial thorn in the side of Tudor monarchs. For the most part
the English regarded the expulsion of the Scots as crucial for the settlement of the north, although at
times alliance was made with the MacDonalds against the O’Neills. Meanwhile, the efforts of the
English to utilize the influence of Archibald Campbell, fifth earl of Argyll, to deal with the situation
were promising, but the venture did not come to fruition (Dawson, Politics of Religion, 128). Such
inconsistency in policy exacerbated levels of unrest, and the English were unable to deal with the
movement of Scots into the north. James VI had been content to allow his Highland subjects to cause
problems for Elizabeth, but as his succession to the English crown loomed ever closer, the king realized
the necessity of extending law and order throughout Ireland.
20 Proclamation concerning the inhabitants of Lewis, 18 July 1605, RPCS, 7:89; Letter from the
Edinburgh Council to James, 3 March 1607, RPCS, 7:513–14, n. 1. James was aware of English
attitudes toward the Scots.
21 King and Council commission against Lewis, 18 July 1605, RPCS, 7:84–87; Proclamation con-
cerning the inhabitants of Lewis, 18 July 1605, RPCS, 7:89–90; Charges for rendering the castles of
the Isles, 18 July 1605, RPCS, 7:87–89; Charges for rendering limfads and galleys, 18 July 1605,
RPCS, 7:87–89, 87; M. Perceval-Maxwell, Scottish Migration to Ulster in the Reign of James VI (London,
1973), 12.
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economically, but it would also increase Scotland’s reputation in a wider European
context.22
James was aware of the problem of his “north,” the north and west Highlands
and Isles, where men followed clan chiefs and lived according to their own rules.23
Highland lawlessness had been of concern to Scottish monarchs throughout the
previous centuries, and especially to James V in the 1530s; but James VI and I,
as monarch of three kingdoms, was particularly preoccupied with it because of
the detrimental impact it could have on his attempts to pacify the north of Ireland.24
In July 1604 the king confirmed an earlier grant of all the lands of the Route and
the Glens in the north of Ireland to Sir Randal MacDonnell.25 This grant contained
a clause that authorized Sir Randal to divide the territory into parts of around
2,000 acres and build a castle or mansion house in each. Later, between December
1604 and February 1606, James issued instructions and grants that laid the foun-
dations for the Hamilton-Montgomery plantation of Down and the Ards in the
northeast of Ireland.26 If such endeavors were to be successful, James would have
to limit the movement of the Highlanders from the west of Scotland to the north
of Ireland.27 In short, as far as James was concerned, the situation in the Highlands
was of “grite hurt” to “the commonweill.” It was offensive also to his position
as sovereign.28
While James liked to theorize about kingship, as The Trew Law of Free Monarchies
highlights, in practice he was prepared to compromise to reach a workable solution,
as suggested in Basilicon Doron and evident in his grant to the Irish Catholic
Randal MacDonnell.29 The fundamental principle that James would not compro-
22 Proclamation for the Isles, 13 June 1605, RPCS, 7:59–60; Proclamation for the west Isles, 27
June 1605, RPCS, 7:68–69; Warrant for pressing of mariners, 27 June 1605, RPCS, 7:69–70; Com-
mission of lieutenancy in the west Isles and Kintyre, 8 August 1605, RPCS, 7:115–17; The Gentlemen
Adventurers of Lewis, 31 July 1606, RPCS, 7:229; Letter from James to the Three Estates of Scotland,
11 February 1605, RPCS, 7:466. James knew that success in this venture would reflect on his standing,
both at home and on the continent. Perhaps specifically he had the Dutch in mind, as their fishing in
the region was hampered by the lawless activities of his island subjects. See Aonghas MacCoinnich,
“Native, Stranger and the Fishing of the Isles, 1611–1637,” paper in Occasional Proceedings of Northern
European Historical Research Network, delivered at Aberdeen, August 2005.
23 Robert Bartlett, Gerald of Wales (Oxford, 1982), 158–77; David B. Quinn, “Ireland and Sixteenth
Century European Expansion” in Historical Studies I, ed. T. Desmond Williams (London, 1958),
20–32; Debora Shuger, “Irishmen, Aristocrats, and Other White Barbarians,” Renaissance Quarterly
50, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 494–525. James’s civilizing policy had its roots in classical antiquity. Shuger
points out that “civility,” as a program of reform, was not limited to the Gaels of Ireland and Scotland.
24 Allan I. Macinnes, “Crown, Clan and Fine: The ‘Civilizing’ of Scottish Gaeldom, 1587–1638,”
in Northern Scotland 13 (1993): 31.
25 Grant to Sir Randal MacDonnell of the Route and the Glens in Antrim and Rathlin Island, 14
April 1604, BL Add. MS, 36775, fols. 138b–139; Confirmation of earlier grant to Sir Randal
MacDonnell, 6 July 1604, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), D2977/5/1/1/2.
26 Perceval-Maxwell, Scottish Migration to Ulster, 47–56; Letter from James to Sir Arthur Chichester,
16 April 1605, Calendar of State Papers relating to Ireland (CSPI), ed. Hans Claude Hamilton et al.,
24 vols. (London, 1860–1911), 12:271–72.
27 There was a long tradition of Scottish fighting men migrating to Ireland, either on a temporary
or permanent basis. See Gerald A. Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland, 1565–1603 (Dublin,
1937); Dawson, Politics of Religion, 5–6, 51–52, 163–64, 202–5.
28 Proclamation concerning the inhabitants of Lewis, 18 July 1605, RPCS, 7:89–90.
29 Sommerville, King James VI and I, 1–61, 62–84; Jenny Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community:
Scotland, 1470–1625 (Edinburgh, 1981), 148.
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mise on, however, was recognition of his royal authority.30 While the Highland
elite undoubtedly recognized James as their king, holding their lands from the
crown by charter, their compliance with crown policy was marginal. Local issues
came to the fore too readily, and, due to complex networks of alliances between
clan chiefs, a minor dispute could escalate rapidly, leading to widespread disorder.
James saw this problem as stemming from the ongoing refusal on the part of
Highland chiefs to acknowledge his sovereignty and remained even more deter-
mined to deal with continued lawlessness in the west. James sought to utilize a
tried and tested, and relatively successful, initiative of his predecessors and turned
to local and regional magnates to help execute royal policy in the west.
Throughout the sixteenth century, successive Scottish monarchs had delegated
responsibility for the Highlands and Isles to the Gordons of Huntly in the North
Isles and the Campbells of Argyll in the South Isles. James now looked to the
heads of these houses. On 3 December 1606 James declared his intention that
George Gordon, sixth earl and first marquess of Huntly, should “reduce the North
Yllis . . . to civilitie and oure obedyence.” The finer details of the plan were
thrashed out over the following months, and on 30 April 1607 Huntly agreed to
undertake the business of settling the region, to be achieved by extirpation of the
inhabitants, specifically the Clan Donald. Fortunately for them, the Clan Donald
and the rest of the inhabitants of the North Isles received an eleventh-hour reprieve,
albeit indirectly. While Huntly offered to undertake the project at his own expense,
there had been no agreement concerning the annual duty to be paid by the
marquess. Huntly would not agree to more than £400 Scots per year, which the
Privy Council considered “a very meane dewytie for the haill North Yllis.”31 At
the same time, James finally gave in to pressure from an increasingly outspoken
Protestant kirk that sought to push ecclesiastical proceedings against Huntly on
30 Roger Mason, “Renaissance and Reformation: The Sixteenth Century,” in Scotland: A History, ed.
Jenny Wormald (Oxford, 2005), 138–39. I would like to thank Alan Macdonald, University of Dundee,
for discussing this point with me.
31 Articles proposed by the council concerning the marquis of Huntly’s undertaking for the North
Isles, 30 April 1607, RPCS, 7:360–62; Letter from James to the Edinburgh Council concerning the
marquis of Huntly, 3 December 1606, RPCS, 7:504; Letter from James to the Edinburgh Council
concerning the marquis of Huntly, 16 March 1607, RPCS, 7:516–17; Letter from the Edinburgh
Council to James concerning the marquis of Huntly, 26 March 1607, RPCS, 7:518–19; Letter from
James to the Edinburgh Council concerning the marquis of Huntly, 7 April 1607, RPCS, 7:520–21;
Letter from the Edinburgh Council to James concerning the marquis of Huntly, (?) May 1607, RPCS,
7:523–24; Letter from James to the Edinburgh Council concerning the marquis of Huntly, 20 May
1607, RPCS, 7:524–25; Letter from the Edinburgh Council to James concerning the marquis of Huntly,
19 June 1607, RPCS, 7:528–29; Goodare, “Statutes of Iona,” 33. Huntly agreed before the council
“to tak in hand the service of setling of the North Yllis undir his Majesteis obedyence . . . and to putt
ane end to that service be extirpatioun of the barbarous people of the Yllis within a yeare.” Although
he had been extending his authority in this region throughout the later sixteenth century, Huntly’s
refusal to agree to a higher annual duty may have been a deliberate move on his part to stall, if not
thwart completely, this plan. The marquess, aware of the failure of the first two attempts at plantation
of Lewis by the Fife Adventurers and of the third attempt under way but reaching no successful
conclusion, would have had little desire to see such an eventuality played out in the North Isles under
his watch.
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account of his Catholicism.32 In June 1607, Huntly was ordered to confine himself
within the burgh of Aberdeen, thereby ensuring that he played no further part in
the plantation in the Isles.33
The fortunes of Archibald Campbell, seventh earl of Argyll, in the Isles were
rather different. The Campbell clan had been acquiring further territory and in-
fluence stealthily in the southwest Highlands and Isles of Scotland ever since the
forfeiture of the MacDonald lordship of the Isles in 1493. The situation was further
exacerbated by the fact that successive earls of Argyll had been able to gain crown
commission to pursue unruly Highland clans, specifically the Clan Donald, and
had benefited from such service to the crown. But the Campbells had faced internal
weakness during the minority of the seventh earl, and James appeared reluctant
to extend Campbell jurisdiction in the west.34 However, in the early years of the
seventeenth century, Argyll had been instrumental in executing James’s action
against the MacGregors, and in return the king “maid promise to give to the Erle
of Ergyle ane worthie reward, to remayne heretablie with him and his aires heir-
after.” The reward asked for in 1607 was a “gift of the landis of Kintyre,” lands
previously held by the Clan Donald South. In putting forward Argyll’s case, the
Privy Council reminded James that the lands were small and that “na proffeitt
thay evir importeit to the King, his Majestie often tymes being driven to put the
cuntrey to greitar chairges in the space of thrie or four yeir for getting in of the
rent thairof, quhilk is nocht greit, than mycht haif doubled the pryce and utter
valew of the haill land.” The council continued, asserting that a grant of Kintyre
to the earl would assist Argyll in action against the Clan Donald, “the strangest
piller of all the broken hieland men, quha nevir in any aige wer civill, bot hes bein
the scoolemaisteris and fosteraris of all barbaritie, savaignes, and crueltye—hes evir
from the beginning bein addictit nocht only to rebellioun within this continent
land and the iles, bot evir wer assisteris of the northern Irische people, dwelling
in Ireland, in all thair rebellionis.” Thus, Argyll’s action against the Clan Donald
“nocht only will . . . procuire thair ruitteing out and utter suppressing, bot upoun
that same respect will evir be ane feir to those in the northe of Ireland to rebel,
having ane enemye lyand sa neir to thame.” The council was well aware of the
wider context of James’s policy and emphasized that the gift of Kintyre to Argyll
would assist in establishing law and order in Scotland—and Ireland. This reflects
the view long held by successive English governments that the west of Scotland
constantly encouraged rebels in the nearby north of Ireland and supplied them
with men and munitions. Pacifying the west of Scotland, therefore, would ensure
32 James had managed the conflicting interests of the Catholic party and the kirk in Scotland suc-
cessfully by making concessions to one in order to gain support for measures against the other. By
1607 he had neutralized the threat of the radical Presbyterians in Scotland but was pushing through
reform of the church along Erastian lines. The action against Huntly was to satisfy an already disgruntled
kirk, as well as wider Protestant opinion throughout his kingdoms in the wake of the failed gunpowder
plot. Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V–James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), 186–96, 204–8; Mason,
“Renaissance and Reformation,” 136–42; Jenny Wormald, “Confidence and Perplexity: The Seven-
teenth Century,” in Wormald, Scotland, 145–53.
33 Council order for the arrest of vessels to be employed in reducing the Isles, 21 May 1608, RPCS,
8:94.
34 After Huntly’s defeat of crown forces, led by Argyll, at the battle of Glenlivet in 1594, Argyll was
committed to ward for a short period. However, Campbell influence in the west of Scotland was such
that, at times, James would come to rely on him for execution of crown policy in the region.
STATUTES OF IONA  13
stability in the north of Ireland. Also, in economic terms it would be of great
benefit, a point the council, in advocating “the removeing of that mischevous Clan
. . . thair utter extirpatioun and ruitteing out,” made clear to the king: “sa lang
as the said Clan Donald remaynes unremoveit furth of the saidis landis, his Majestie
nor na utheris sal half any proffeit, and the uncivilitie and barbaritie sall continew
nocht only thair bot in the Iles.” James needed little more persuasion, and Argyll
was granted legal tenure of the lands of Kintyre on 30 May 1607.35
The acquisition by the Campbell chief of land formerly pertaining to Clan
Donald South was not well received in the west, and it resulted in the spontaneous
outbreak of rebellion. On 16 July 1607, Sir Arthur Chichester, lord deputy of
Ireland, wrote to the English Privy Council with intelligence that Angus Mac-
Donald and his men were planning an attack on Kintyre, also stating he had written
to the earl of Argyll.36 Two weeks later, on 31 July 1607, the Scottish Privy Council
likewise noted that Angus MacDonald and others of the Clan Donald had amassed
a force of men and galleys with the intention “to invaid and persew his Majesteis
guid subjectis be sey and land.” As a result of this unrest by the Highlanders, on
12 August 1607 the earl of Argyll received a commission of lieutenancy and
justiciary that extended across much of the South Isles.37
In presenting Argyll’s case to the king, the council had mentioned the earl’s
action against the Clan Donald South as important not just within a Scottish
context, but within a wider archipelagic one. This was a calculated move. The
council was aware of the king’s belief that unrest in one of his kingdoms had
repercussions in another, and James had emphasized the importance of his policies
toward the Highlands as being not just for the commonweal of Scotland, but for
his “haill impyre.” The council asserted that Argyll would bring stability to the
Highlands and secure the coastal borders against the Irish rebels, who sought aid
from and refuge in the west of Scotland. This was a deliberate attempt to ensure
James would grant Kintyre to Argyll, rather than continue to work toward a
solution involving the MacDonald chief himself and his son James.38
Earlier in the 1590s Argyll had been threatened by the king’s attempts to reach
a settlement with the Hebridean elite. Agreements regarding plantation in the
35 Letter concerning the earl of Argyll’s claim to Kintyre, (?) 1607, RPCS, 7:749–50; Grant of lands
in Kintyre to the earl of Argyll, 30 May 1607, in Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scotorum (RMS),
ed. John Maitland Thomson et al., 11 vols. (Edinburgh, 1912–), 6:1911; Letter from Sir George Carey
Lord Justice of Ireland to Sir Robert Cecil, 3 December 1599, CSPI, 8:295–96; “Remedies [for Irish
incursions], and the Benefits which will accrue from them,” n.d., CSPI, 11:666–67; “Ratification to
the Erle of Argyill,” 28 June 1617, APS, 4:559–60. Since the 1580s James had spoken repeatedly of
the rich economic resources of the Highlands and Isles that were underexploited by the inhabitants
while, at the same time, aware that the crown had never received full rental from the region.
36 Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London Council, 16 July 1607, CSPI, 13:223. Chichester
had “received intelligence from the sea-coasts of Ulster, and especially of Antrim, that Angus M’Connell
. . . with some other confederates . . . were up in arms in the Islands of Scotland, intending to make
attempts upon those coasts, and especially that of Cantyre (of which Angus pretends to be lord) and
also upon the opposite parts of this realm.”
37 Proclamation concerning MacDonald of Dunivaig, 31 July 1607, RPCS, 4:423; Commission of
justiciary to the earl of Argyll over the Isles, 12 August 1607, RPCS, 7:426–72. The commission
excluded the North Isles.
38 After Angus MacDonald’s submission in the wake of Lord Scone’s expedition, the chief had
attempted to negotiate with council and had submitted proposals; see Robert Pitcairn, ed., Criminal
Trials in Scotland, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1833), 3:365–66.
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western Isles were made with Angus MacDonald of Clan Donald South in 1596
and with Angus’s son, James MacDonald of Knockrinsay, in 1599, although these
were never implemented.39 In 1597 James MacDonnell of the Glens in Ireland
had won the favor of James VI while visiting the Scottish court, and, although
he was denied title to Kintyre and Islay, he was knighted in December, becoming
Sir James MacDonnell of Dunluce and gaining lands in south Kintyre.40 Mac-
Donnell sought to reunite the Clan Donald lands, but Argyll, fearful of a reunited
and reinvigorated MacDonald lordship that straddled the Irish Sea, was able to
thwart such endeavors through the influence he had at council.41 As a consequence
of the failure to reach a workable solution with the Highland chiefs, combined
with ongoing rebellion on Lewis, the king looked to regional magnates and Low-
land lords for assistance in civilizing the region. Argyll was ready to exploit any
opportunity to extend his authority in the Isles, and while the MacDonalds con-
tinued to feud among themselves, the Campbells worked to extend their influence
at Clan Donald expense.42 However, events in Ireland in 1607 and 1608 would
alter the course of Highland history dramatically.
THE SITUATION IN IRELAND
Although James had been developing plantation schemes in relation to the western
Isles of Scotland, on inheriting the throne of Ireland in 1603 he was reluctant
initially to extend this policy into Ireland. Michael Perceval-Maxwell argued that
the main reason for his change of mind was financial. When James realized the
cost of maintaining order in Ulster, the idea of plantation suddenly became more
attractive, although it is questionable whether at this juncture James envisaged
extending such a plan across all of Ulster. Indeed, Perceval-Maxwell held that pre-
1607 plantation meant simply “the changing of Irish tenure to English, with the
introduction of non-Irish persons being kept to a minimum.”43 In 1605, when
James had granted the lands formerly held by Con O’Neill of Clandeboye in Down
and the Ards to a Scot, James Hamilton, the son of a minister from Dunlop in
Ayrshire, part of the grant stipulated that one-third of these lands would be passed
to Hugh Montgomery, sixth laird of Braidstane, and another third to Con O’Neill
himself. Nonetheless, Hamilton and Montgomery were to provide enough Scottish
39 Gregory, History of the Western Highlands, 288–90; and see n. 15 above.
40 Grant to James MacDonald of Dunluce of lands in Kintyre, 4 May 1597, RMS, 6:554. It is not
clear exactly how James MacDonnell won the favor of the king. Gregory (History of the Western
Highlands, 266–69, 273–74) asserts that James requested the assistance “as should be required” of
MacDonnell in an expedition of 1596 to the Isles. The following year, MacDonnell “accepted an
invitation to visit the Court of Scotland” when he was “described by several Scottish writers of the
period as a man of handsome appearance and dignified manners; and, although ignorant of the Lowland
tongue, he speedily became a great favorite”; The Warrender Papers, vol. 2., ed. Annie I. Cameron
(Edinburgh, Scottish History Society, 1932), 429–30.
41 Pitcairn, Criminal Trials in Scotland, 3:365–66; Gregory, History of the Western Highlands,
310–11.
42 Argyll had been able to manipulate the council in order to thwart the efforts of Angus MacDonald
of Dunivaig and his son, Sir James, to secure continued possession of Kintyre and Islay. See Gregory,
History of the Western Highlands, 272–74, 287–90, 305–13; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials in Scotland, 3:
365–66.
43 Perceval-Maxwell, Scottish Migration to Ulster, 74, 76.
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and English tenants to secure plantation of one-third of O’Neill’s estate. Of greater
significance, however, is the fact that Down and Ards were divided up in such a
way as to ensure that the Scots Hamilton and Montgomery had control of the
east coast.44 This was a strategic move: it offered a base from which expeditions
could be launched, while it also ensured the continuation of trade.45
James’s agenda for Ulster at this stage may not have included widespread plan-
tation, but the king was warming to the strategic and economic benefits he might
reap from such a policy. Scots had been settling in the north of Ireland unofficially
for decades, and even in 1606 Sir Thomas Craig commented independently on
the “stream of emigrants” that passed daily into Ulster.46 James now envisaged
the planting of significant numbers of loyal, law-abiding “British” subjects who
would advance commercial activities in the area, and in some cases there was no
need to remove the tenants as they could be used to work the land.
Removal of the Irish elite had not been part of his original plan. Indeed, im-
mediately after his succession to the thrones of England and Ireland, O’Neill
submitted to the king, receiving in return a pardon and a patent to his lands. Rory
O’Donnell likewise submitted and soon after was elevated to an earldom. A short
time later, James issued a grant of the Route and the Glens to Sir Randal
MacDonnell. This was more than recognition of the de facto situation in the
north; it was an indication of James’s willingness to work with those who were
prepared to cooperate with him. James’s preference may well have been for Prot-
estant undertakers whose loyalty he could be assured of, and, as he later asserted,
“the settling of religion, the introducing civility, order, and government amongst
a barbarous and unsubdued people” were “acts of piety and glory, and worthy
always of a Christian prince to endeavour.”47 In practice, however, James was happy
to accept Catholic, and indeed Irish Catholic, undertakers like Randal MacDonnell
of Antrim, brother of Sir James MacDonnell of Dunluce, so long as they ac-
knowledged James’s authority and his position as king of Ireland.48 While the
Scottish branch of the family continued to cause trouble, the Irish branch appeared
much more amenable to cooperation with the crown.
James sought to work with Irish lords like MacDonnell in order to pacify the
north of Ireland, and he aimed for further cooperation with O’Neill and O’Donnell
too, as he considered this to be the best and cheapest means of stabilizing the
region. Forced removal of the native elite had not been given serious consideration,
although he had initiated such a policy in the Highlands and Isles of Scotland,
albeit without much success. It was the decision by the Irish lords themselves to
depart for the continent—the Flight of the Earls—that offered James the oppor-
tunity to develop a scheme for plantation in Ulster that was much more ambitious
than anything he had conceived of previously.
44 Grant to Hugh Montgomery and James Hamilton, 5 November 1605, PRONI, D4216/B/1–2.
45 Perceval-Maxwell, Scottish Migration to Ulster, 49–60.
46 Sir Thomas Craig, De Unione Regnorum Britanniæ Tractatus, ed. C. Sanford Terry (Edinburgh,
Scottish History Society, 1909), 446–47.
47 Submission of the earl of Tyrone, 8 April 1603, CSPI, 11:13–14; Letter from James to the earl
of Devonshire, Lieutenant of Ireland, 4 September 1603, CSPI, 11:79–80; Letter from James to Sir
Arthur Chichester, 21 December 1612, CSPI, 15:310.
48 James’s personal attitude toward Catholicism was clear. His wife, Anne of Denmark, his chancellor,
the earl of Dunfermline, and his close friend, Huntly, were all Catholics.
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On 18 September 1607, the Privy Council in Edinburgh noted that “some
noblemen of the cuntrey of Ireland, with a nowmer of thair speciall freindis and
dependairis, hes of lait, without the previtie, knawlege, and consent of his Majestie,
or of the Lord Deputie of Ireland, tane schipping in Lochfuillie [Lough Swilly]
for some treasonable deseygne and practize aganis his Majesties estate and cuntrey.”
In response, the council ordered the sheriff of Wigtown, the steward of Kirkcud-
bright, and the magistrates of the burgh of Kirkcudbright and all other towns
along the west coast to give “diligent attendance . . . be day and nycht, upoun
thair coistis and harboreyis, to espy gif ony Ireland men sall cum willinglie in thair
boundis or be contrarious windis salbe drevin upoun thair coistis.” If any Irishmen
did land in Scotland, men and ships were to be arrested and handed over to the
authorities. Concerned that the fallout from the flight would heighten an already
unstable situation in the west of Scotland, this legislation was designed to try to
contain the situation. But apart from this, the event passed with Scotland, or at
least the Scottish administration, barely raising a collective eyebrow.49
The flight of O’Neill and O’Donnell and their associates in September 1607
certainly was unexpected, for James had harbored hopes that he might forge a
workable relationship with O’Neill.50 Their departure, and feared imminent return,
focused the minds of many in Ireland and England. The Flight of the Earls, and
the subsequent rebellion of Sir Cahir O’Doherty, was “providential” for James.
The removal of the elite from Tyrone and Tyrconnell allowed James to take back
into crown hands a large swath of land in the west of Ulster, and it offered him
the opportunity to reconsider his plans for Ireland.51 Within thirteen days of the
departure of the earls from Ireland, Chichester had drawn up two proposals for
reallocation of their Irish estates. He promoted plans for plantation and sought
to convince James that it was a sound economic move, while also securing law
and order in a region with a long history of disorder. But while the Flight of the
49 Council charge for arresting some men from Ireland, 18 September 1607, RPCS, 7:439. The
Scottish Council’s reaction, and indeed the lack of it, to the Flight of the Earls is surprising. My thanks
to Nicholas Canny for helpful comments on this point.
50 O’Neill’s rebellion against English authority effectively ended with defeat at the Battle of Kinsale
on 24 December 1601, although generous terms for O’Neill were gained through the Treaty of
Mellifont of 30 March 1603. O’Neill and O’Donnell subsequently accompanied Lord Deputy Mountjoy
to London to meet James who upheld the terms of the treaty, although it was widely unpopular in
England. In the following years O’Neill increasingly found himself under attack from various directions
including legal questions regarding his and O’Donnell’s claims to land, while O’Donnell and Cucon-
naught Maguire faced severe financial difficulties as well. Combined with O’Neill’s growing paranoia
regarding his own safety, this resulted in the three men fleeing with their families to Spain. Nicholas
Canny, “The Flight of the Earls, 1607,” Irish Historical Studies 17, no. 67 (March 1971): 380–99;
Hiram Morgan, Tyrone’s Rebellion: The Outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland (Woodbridge,
1993); Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British, 174–87; John McCavitt, “The Flight of the Earls,”
Irish Historical Studies 29, no. 113 (May 1994): 159–73; Michael D. Finnegan, “Tyrone’s Rebellion:
Hugh O’Neill and the Outbreak of the Nine Years War in Ulster” (MA thesis, National University of
Ireland, Galway, 2001); John McCavitt, The Flight of the Earls (Dublin, 2002); Nicholas Canny, “Hugh
O’Neill [Aodh O´ Ne´ill], second earl of Tyrone (c. 1550–1616),” Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (ODNB) (London, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com.
51 Canny, Making Ireland British, 133–34. Elizabethan plantation schemes were justified by reference
to the theory of res nullia or “empty land.” In 1608 the crown claimed to have at its disposal all, or
significantly large parts, of the counties of Armagh, Cavan, Coleraine, Donegal, Fermanagh, and Tyrone.
County Coleraine was later designated County Londonderry. And see n. 70 below.
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Earls in 1607 would alter the situation in Ireland, the event had repercussions
across the water in Scotland as well.
THE ARCHIPELAGIC CONTEXT
Plantation was to be advanced by Scottish and English undertakers.52 Chichester
actually advocated Scottish and Irish involvement in the project from the outset,
albeit in a secondary role with the English as the main undertakers. The Scots and
Irish would be predominately tenants, while the English undertakers were to have
the first choice of land. This attitude stemmed from his belief that a successful
outcome of the scheme for the plantation of Ulster would result from integration
of Irish, Scots, and English. Chichester, after all, was well aware of the extent of
Scottish settlement that had already taken place in Ulster and of the success of
the Hamilton-Montgomery plantation in Down and the Ards. If plantation was
to succeed, the cooperation of these Scots with the crown’s plans would be ad-
vantageous.53 But as plans evolved, Chichester increasingly became concerned at
the role the Scots were to play in the plantation of Ulster. He was uneasy that
they would be not only tenants but undertakers as well and was reluctant to see
large-scale removal of the Irish if they were only to be replaced by a certain type
of Scot. He explained his position in a letter to Salisbury: “if the nobility and
subjects of Scotland . . . be permitted to bring over the islanders or their neigh-
bours of those northern parts . . . more trouble and less profit will arise from
thence, than if the Irish themselves held it as they now do.”54
Nonetheless, Chichester continued to believe that Scottish participation in the
Ulster venture was crucial for establishing and maintaining both an English pres-
ence and Protestantism. Others in the English Council advocated the removal of
the Irish on account of their being “men full of poison.” In 1607 the Irish attorney
general, Sir John Davies, asserted that “his Majesty’s blessed genius will banish
all those generations of vipers out of it, and make it . . . a right fortunate island.”
In contrast, Chichester had pragmatic reasons for advocating accommodation with
the native Irish: this would limit the extent of opposition the planters would face.55
In Scotland, however, it was the outbreak of Sir Cahir O’Doherty’s rebellion
in Derry in April 1608 that caused greater consternation, provoking a spate of
communication between the Scottish Council and Chichester regarding the de-
ployment of both land and naval forces in Ulster and in the Isles, as well as
additional legislation that aimed to prevent movement of rebels between Scotland
52 Canny, Making Ireland British, 200–201. A distinction was made between undertakers and ser-
vitors. Undertakers “would ‘undertake’ . . . to build defensible buildings on their property, to remove
the existing occupiers . . . and to populate their lands exclusively with English or Scottish Protestant
tenants.” Servitors were those who had served the crown in either a civil or military capacity, and, in
the Ulster context, most were expected to be former army officers. They “were also obliged to build
defensible buildings on their properties, and were encouraged, but not obliged, to place English and
Scottish tenants on their estates.” Any native Irish who gained land were “to promote ‘tillage and
husbandry after the manner of the English Pale.’”
53 Canny, Making Ireland British, 192–93.
54 Perceval-Maxwell, Scottish Migration to Ulster, 81.
55 Letter from Sir John Davies to Salisbury, 12 September 1607, CSPI, 13:273; Canny, Making
Ireland British, 191–92, 236.
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and Ireland.56 The rebellion of Sir Cahir O’Doherty witnessed a combined naval
and land force of English, Irish, and Scots in a coordinated effort to prevent the
rebels receiving aid from, or shelter in, Scotland.57 Following the outbreak of
rebellion, Chichester wrote to the Scottish Privy Council on 24 April 1608.58 He
expressed his concern that the Highlanders and Islesmen of Scotland “being now
in ill grace withe his Majestie, sould transporte over ony assistance unto thame
[the Irish rebels] quhairthrough thay may grow togidder to greatair insolenceis,
and bring mony otheris into thair pairtye whilkis otherwise durst not declair tha-
meselffis.” To assist his efforts, Chichester asked for two ships. They were “to be
rigged and sett furth with all dew expeditioun, for refraining the comeing hither
of those Ylandaris to succour the Kingis rebellis on this syde during oure prose-
quutioun of thame.”59 Considering that the activity of Scots in the north of Ireland
had been regarded for some time as an obstacle to both the successful imple-
mentation of Tudor policy and the peace and stability of the region, Chichester’s
fears were entirely justified.
The council in Edinburgh was also concerned. From its perspective, the rebellion
had the potential to “progres ouer mony other pairtis of his Majesteis dominionis,
and sua disturb the haill body of the estate.” Because the rebellion in Ireland
occurred “so neir to the coistis of this kingdome,” the imminent arrival of “re-
bellious and traterous subjectis of Yrland” who continued to “prosequutis thair
shamefull rebellioun and defectioun with thair haill poueris and endevoiris” carried
“no litle appeirance of prejudice to this Estate, besydis the generall disturbance
of his Majesteis haill impyre.” Of more immediate concern was the extent to which
the rebellion could undermine the ongoing preparations for the expedition to the
Highlands and Isles, which sought to extend “civile societie” in the region. Indeed,
the day after receiving Chichester’s letter, the Scottish Privy Council ordered wap-
inshaws to be held on 9 May in an effort to prepare the realm against “foreyne
invasioun . . . domestique and intestine seditioun.”60 This was followed up six
56 Sir Cahir O’Doherty had been an English ally prior to this rebellion, which, far from being an
attempt to overthrow the English garrison at Derry, was motivated primarily by local and personal
factors. The governor of Derry, Sir George Paulet, “played a major role in provoking” the revolt that
resulted from a dispute concerning the possession of Inch Island. O’Doherty’s rebellion was viewed
as part of the wider plot O’Neill was believed to be organizing against the crown. John McCavitt, Sir
Arthur Chichester Lord Deputy of Ireland, 1605–1616 (Belfast, 1998), 140–48; Robert J. Hunter, “The
End of O’Donnell Power,” in Donegal: History and Society; Interdisciplinary Essays on the History of
an Irish County, ed. William Nolan, Liam Ronayne, and Mariead Dunlevy (Dublin, 1995), 250–51.
57 Convention of Estates concerning forces for service in the Isles, 20 May 1608, RPCS, 8:93;
Commission of lieutenancy over the Isles to Lord Ochiltree, 21 June 1608, RPCS, 8:113–14.
58 On the same day, Dunfermline and Sir Thomas Hamilton wrote to James VI informing him of
“the treusonabill insurrection of Odochartie, and burneing of Derry in Ireland” acknowledging “the
first pairt of oure dewtie wes to mak your maiestir aduerteised with the greatest speid that could be.”
See State Papers and Miscellaneous Correspondence of Thomas, Earl of Melros, ed. James Maidment, 2
vols. (Edinburgh, 1837), 1:44–45.
59 Letter from the Lord Deputy and Irish Council to the Edinburgh Council, 24 April 1608, RPCS,
8:497–98; Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London Council, 4 May 1608, CSPI, 13:501.
60 Proclamation of a general wapinschaw, 25 April 1608, RPCS, 8:78; Proclamation to western shires
for service against Irish rebels, 25 April 1608, RPCS, 8:78–79; Commission of lieutenancy over the
Isles to Lord Ochiltree, 21 June 1608, RPCS, 8:113–14; Letter from the Edinburgh Council to certain
noblemen in the west, 28 April 1608, RPCS, 8:498–99. A wapinshawing was a military muster of men
within a particular region or lordship.
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days later with a royal proclamation stating that no one in Scotland was to provide
refuge for, or give assistance to, any Irish rebels, while any that did arrive in Scotland
were to be apprehended and handed over to the authorities.61
James was apprehensive too. On 9 May he wrote to his council in Edinburgh
informing its members that “oure kingdome” was to be left with enough soldiers
to carry out the pacification of the Isles and, if need be, assist in quashing the
rebellion in Ireland. Therefore, “all leveing of souldiouris to serve in ony foreyne
pairtis be expreslie inhibite and dischargeit.” On the same day, Sir Thomas Phillips,
an English servitor who had obtained Coleraine in 1605, wrote to the council
reiterating Chichester’s request for two ships but elaborating on what was required:
“one of thame of goode burdyne with ordinance in hir, allowing hir ane hundreth
goode men besyde sayllaris, to do some service in the revair of Lochfoyle, and
other to ly in Lochsulley, to stoppe the recourse of barkis and boittis thair.”62
James was aware of the problems his council in Edinburgh was facing regarding
the supply of ships, as proclamations had been made in the east for the arrest of
ships to be put into service in the Isles. But he was concerned with events in
Ireland as well as Scotland and directed the Scottish Council to send 200 men to
Ireland under two captains and to provide two months’ pay.63 On 21 June the
council wrote to the governor of Carrickfergus Castle to inform him the soldiers
had been sent, under captains Patrick Crawford and William Stewart.64
A few weeks later, on 13 July the council in Edinburgh wrote to Chichester.
The council acknowledged that James, “in his princelie and tender affectioun
whiche he indifferentlie beiris to the subjectis of boithe kingdomes, hes gevin
directioun that two hundreth sojouris salbe sent frome thense to the furtherance
of this service.” However the council requested that “no unnecessair burdyne”
be placed on the soldiers and that Chichester be “verie spairing of thair travellis
unles a present and urgent necessitie so requiris.” Rather, they should be kept “in
reddynes attending in some commodious parte upoun the coist most ewest to our
Yllis, quhair thay may be transportit and send over as the occasioun sall present.”
In contrast to this preoccupation regarding the Scottish soldiers sent to Ireland,
the rest of the letter is full of rhetoric regarding close cooperation between the
two kingdoms. While making reference to their “deir Soverane” and his “grite
wisdome and providence,” the Scottish Council asserts that it, and the Irish Coun-
cil, “who ar memberis of one body under so gratious a soverayne and head . . .
aucht to be sensible of otheris harmes” and, therefore, should keep in regular
communication. If this was maintained, the two administrations could “hand in
61 Royal proclamation against supplying the rebels in Ireland, 30 April 1608, RPCS, 8:82–83.
62 Letter from James to the Edinburgh Council, 9 May 1608, RPCS, 8:503; Letter from Thomas
Philips to the Edinburgh Council, 9 May 1608, RPCS, 8:504–5. Phillips had obtained Coleraine from
James Hamilton of the Hamilton-Montgomery plantation. Hamilton had acquired large amounts of
land in Ulster but was persuaded by Chichester to sell a significant amount to other English and
Scotsmen. See Perceval-Maxwell, Scottish Migration to Ulster, 51–55.
63 Letter from the Edinburgh Council to James, 21 May 1608, RPCS, 8:506–7; Letter from the
Edinburgh Council to the governor of Carrickfergus, 30 May 1608, RPCS, 8:508; Letter from the
London Council to Sir Arthur Chichester, 2 June 1608, CSPI, 13:548. On 2 June 1608, however,
the council in England wrote to Chichester informing him that “300 are to be sent over from Scotland.”
64 Letter from the Edinburgh Council to the governor of Carrickfergus, 21 June 1608, RPCS, 8:
511.
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hand, harte in harte, and foote for foote” cooperate to the honor of the king and
for the pacifying of both their respective regions.65
Despite the rhetoric emanating from both the Irish and Scottish councils, most
of the planning behind cooperation between Scotland and Ireland originated in
London with James, who was coordinating policy in all of his three kingdoms.
While both the Irish and Scottish councils complied with James’s directions, ul-
timately each was more concerned with their own respective realm. It was James
who had a wider archipelagic, or “British,” agenda.66 But these traditional, national
perspectives are understandable. Each was jostling with the other in a new, un-
familiar, three-kingdoms context, and each sought to deal with its own problems.
James, however, could see the wider implications of disorder in Ireland or Scotland
for his plans for the outlying regions of his “impyre.” It is within this archipelagic
context that we need to consider James’s plans for the Isles and his response to
the military expedition led by Ochiltree in 1608, which resulted in the impris-
onment in Edinburgh of most of the main Highland chiefs, and the 1609 expe-
dition led by Bishop Knox, which aimed at encouraging cooperation with the
chiefs.
On 10 March 1608 James had expressed his concern that the inhabitants of the
Highlands and Isles continued in their lawlessness, thinking that the king had
forgotten them. Consequently, he conveyed his resolve to deal with them properly.
He would assert his royal authority via land and sea and declared that forces should
meet at Islay on 1 June, to be joined by forces from Ireland, for “reduceing of
the rebellious inhabitantis thairof to his Heynes obedyence and establischeing of
religioun, peace, and justice.” At the same time James was considering his options
in relation to the north of Ireland, now “fred and disburdynit of the former
rebellious and disobedient inhabitantis thairof.” On account of this, he had taken
“a verie princelie and good course, alswele for establischeing of religioun, justice,
and civilitie within the saidis boundis, as for planting of coloneis thairin and dis-
tributing of the same boundis to lauchfull, ansuerable, and weill affected subjectis.”
Plantation in Ireland would “extend the reach of union” and secure James’s vision
of a united Britain.67 The outbreak of O’Doherty’s rebellion threatened to throw
65 Letter from the Edinburgh Council to Sir Arthur Chichester, 13 July 1608, RPCS, 8:512–13.
The letter goes on to mention the 100 soldiers (although previous communication mentioned 200
soldiers) and their conditions of pay.
66 Letter from the Lords and Irish Council to Sir Arthur Chichester, 2 June 1608, CSPI, 13:548–49.
Canny (Making Ireland British, 195) argues that Chichester had “a responsibility” to further James’s
British endeavors, while the councils in Edinburgh and Dublin articulated a “new spirit of co-operation”
around the time of the Flight of the Earls. They may well have done so, but this was due to political
expediency rather than any deeper desire to consider local or national issues in a British context. The
council in England, however, was clear in its prioritization of matters in the other two kingdoms. Orders
sent to Chichester dated 2 June 1608 stated he was “not to divert any of the forces from the work he
has in hand, in order to support the expedition intended against the Isles of Scotland.” Irish affairs,
the council asserted, were “of more consequence” than those of Scotland, “a country where the King
is better assured of his contentment than he can be of Ireland.”
67 Proclamation concerning cooperation of Scottish and Irish forces, 10 March 1608, RPCS, 8:59–61;
Proclamation concerning rebellious Islesmen, 10 March 1608, RPCS, 8:61; Proclamation for colonizing
the north of Ireland with Scotsmen, 28 March 1609, RPCS, 8:267–68; see Paul J. McGinnis and
Arthur H. Williamson, eds., The British Union: A Critical Edition and Translation of David Hume of
Godscroft’s “De Unione Insulae Britannicae” (Aldershot, 2002), 37, 217–23, esp. 217 n. 2, and 223.
Hume advocated English settlements in the west Isles and Lochaber in order to civilize and thus
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the proverbial spanner in James’s plan, so he initiated the steps necessary to co-
ordinate efforts by all three realms in order to contain the situation.
Following a delay in the proposed timescale, James discussed the expedition to
the Isles with his council in Edinburgh. The council had advised James that “the
interpryse of the reduceing of the Yllandis of this kingdome to a perfyte and setled
obedyence is verie necessar and expedient” and should continue as planned.68 James
ordered all forces to meet at Islay on 1 July. However, the king stated his wish
that the expedition should go ahead “by a moderat course, as mycht be least
hurtfull.” His previous assertion to treat with his Highland subjects rigorously had
diluted somewhat and the king appeared to be urging a degree of caution. No
doubt this leniency was a result of the recent actions of O’Doherty. Already facing
rebellion in Ireland, James was reluctant to cause further unrest in the western
Isles.
Naval support for Ochiltree’s expedition to the Isles was sent from England.
On 17 July 1608, Sir William St. John wrote to the council in Edinburgh informing
them of his arrival in Loch Ryan with three ships for service in the Isles: The
Advantage, which was manned and victualled for six months, The Moon, and
Mercury.69 Within a week, O’Doherty’s rebellion was over, although a number of
the main protagonists were still at large. According to the Privy Council’s dec-
laration of 2 August 1608, the rebellion’s coming to an end was nothing short
of a sign from God “manifesting his divyne providence and cair quhilk he hes . . .
for the preservatioun and mantenance of all lauchfull authoriteis.”70
Thus, events in one kingdom directly influenced James’s plan of action else-
where. By adopting a three-kingdoms perspective, James, to a greater degree than
the Scottish and Irish councils, was able to adapt policy as circumstances dictated,
and in this the king was successful. Ochiltree’s expedition progressed as planned,
and by the end of summer the following year Andrew Knox, bishop of the Isles,
had reached a negotiated agreement with the Hebridean chiefs that subsequently
became known as the Statutes of Iona.71
politicize the local inhabitants. This would ensure that the English saw these parts of the realm as their
responsibility too, crucial in order to attain his vision of a united Britain. Indeed, as Hume urged James,
“if you secure the farthest parts, there will be no region in which division may begin.”
68 Council order for the arrest of vessels to be employed in reducing the Isles, 21 May 1608, RPCS,
8:94–95; New issue of royal proclamation concerning the reduction of the Isles, 21 May 1608, RPCS,
8:95.
69 Letter from Sir William St. John to the Edinburgh Council, 17 July 1608, RPCS, 8:514–15; Letter
from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London Council, 16 July 1607, CSPI, 13:223. Prior to this, Captain
St. John had been “employed on the coasts of Munster,” but now, according to Chichester, he was
“to ply up and down the channel and from the river of Strangford to that of Loghfoile . . . to amuse
the rebels that perhaps they would lie still.” See also Letter from the earl of Dunfermline concerning
soldiers sent to Ireland including an account of payment, 13 July 1608, BL Add. MS, 32476, fols.
9–11.
70 Proclamation for apprehension of Phelim Reogh MacDavid, 2 August 1608, RPCS, 8:139–41.
James’s “glorious and notable victorie over the wicked and detestable traytour O’Dogarty” was evidence
of the “detestatioun” in which God “haldeth ungraitfull, disloyall, and trayterous subjectis, who, spend-
ing the course of thair naturall lyff in impietie, treasoun, and falshoode, make thair end and funerallis
to be infamous, tragicall, and miserable.”
71 Andrew Stewart, third Lord Ochiltree, was a member of the Stewart family descended from Mur-
doch Stewart, duke of Albany, grandson of King Robert II. In 1534 his great-grandfather, Andrew
Stewart, third Lord Avondale, had exchanged his barony of Avondale for that of Ochiltree in Ayrshire
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THE STATUTES OF IONA: CONTEXT
The Statutes of Iona, of which there are seven in total, have been regarded pop-
ularly as an attack on Gaelic culture.72 There is no doubt that some of the statutes
sought to modify certain aspects of Gaelic society and behavior. Yet rather than
attacking Gaelic culture, the aim of the statutes was to improve the living standards
of the inhabitants of the region, maintain the position of the traditional elite, and
assimilate the chiefs into wider Scottish society.73 Hence, both Macinnes and
MacGregor have highlighted the statutes’ concern with economic issues. For ex-
ample, the suppression of sorning—the free extraction of food and drink by trav-
elers and strangers—was necessary because it was “an intolerable burden” on
Highland society.74 Instead, inns were to be established so that “straingeris, pas-
singeris and utheris idill men” could purchase bed and board for “reasonable
expensis.” In addition there was an effort to limit trade in wines and whisky, as
this would undermine the viability of the inns and hinder the socioeconomic
improvement of Highland society. Other statutes were concerned with reform of
religion, the provision of education for the eldest sons of the chiefs, the movement
of itinerants and other “idill and sturdie beggaris” that were a further drain on
the resources of Gaelic society, and the limitation of the use of firearms throughout
the wider population.75 Another statute aimed at preventing the military element
within clan society from continuing their activity in either Scotland or Ireland,
thereby ensuring these clansmen did not obstruct the plantation of Ulster. James
made it clear that this military class had two options: “tak thame selffis to industrie”
or “face transportation and banishment.”76 Therefore, far from being, as Goodare
has described them, “a temporary tidying-up operation,” “paradoxical,” and “in-
with Sir James Hamilton of Finnart, and later, in 1543, he was recognized as a lord of parliament with
the title Lord Stewart of Ochiltree. Andrew, second Lord Ochiltree, had played an important role
during the years of the reformation of religion in Scotland. Grandson of the second lord, Andrew, third
Lord Ochiltree, was a nephew of James Stewart, earl of Arran, a favorite of James VI for a time. He
was a member of the Privy Council, first Lord of the Bedchamber, governor of Edinburgh Castle, and
General of the Ordnance. Andrew Knox was born in Renfrewshire, the second son of John Knox of
Ranfurly in Kilbarchan parish. After studying at Glasgow University during the time of Andrew Melville,
he was appointed minister of Lochwinnoch, Renfrewshire, in 1581, and then Paisley in 1585. During
the 1590s he performed a number of services for James VI that resulted in his promotion to the
bishopric of the Isles in 1605. The following year Knox visited his diocese with a new seal depicting
a bishop in an open boat. Thus, both Ochiltree and Knox had strong familial, political, and religious
connections in the west and would have been familiar with crown reliance on the naval power of families
in the region. See Margaret H. B. Sanderson, “Andrew Stewart, second Lord Ochiltree,” ODNB; James
Kirk, “Andrew Knox, bishop of Raphoe,” ODNB; J. Balfour Paul, The Scots Peerage, 9 vols. (Edinburgh,
1909), 6:509–17.
72 Macgregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 138.
73 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 29–30; Macinnes, Clanship, 65. Macinnes asserts that the main
impetus behind this legislation was “to educate the fine [clan elite] about their responsibilities as
members of the Scottish landed classes.”
74 Macinnes, Clanship, 65–73; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 138–50.
75 Statutes of Iona, agreed 23 August 1609, registered 27 July 1610, RPCS, 9:27, 29. MacGregor
(“Statutes of Iona,” 150) suggests that the statute on firearms signified “the desire to preserve hunting—
very much a traditional benchmark of behaviour and identity for the Gaelic elite—as an aristocratic
monopoly.”
76 James’s Instructions to the Lords Commissioners concerning the Isles, 9 February 1609, RPCS,
8:745–46; Macinnes, Clanship, 67.
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imical” to the power of the elite, MacGregor asserted that the statutes constituted
a “coherent program, paramount being the economic condition of the Isles.” In
relation to clan society itself, Macinnes argued that the “privileged position” of
the chiefs was “upheld and defined at the expense of their clansmen.”77 Meanwhile,
more concerned with context than content, Maurice Lee argued that the statutes
represented a “virtual abandonment of the colonization policy.”78 While efforts
to plant Lewis continued until 1610, to view the statutes, and indeed James VI
and I’s wider policy, in this light is to adopt a Scottish, rather than a British,
perspective. But it is precisely this British, or archipelagic, context that is crucial
to understanding both the statutes themselves and James’s policy toward his three
kingdoms.
Events in Ireland from September 1607 to July 1608 dramatically changed the
wider context. The Flight of the Earls in September 1607 and the rebellion, and
subsequent forfeiture, of Sir Cahir O’Doherty left large swaths of land in the north
of Ireland vacant. With the removal of the native elite, James could contemplate
plantation in Ulster on a grand scale in the north and west, while in the east
Randal MacDonnell was already cooperating with the crown. But James was cau-
tious regarding the development and implementation of plantation in both Ireland
and the west of Scotland. Plantation could be considered for Ireland, but recent
experience in Scotland did not bode well. At the same time, in light of long-
standing traffic between the west of Scotland and the north of Ireland, further
dispossession of the Hebridean elite could severely hamper efforts at plantation.
Instead, a negotiated settlement with the native elite in Scotland would realize
lasting and beneficial results, as we can see by tracing the events that led from
Ochiltree’s expedition to the statutes.
In spring 1608, around the time of the O’Doherty rebellion, “strategy toward
the west remained coercive,” but by the end of the year this had shifted, due to
the quick suppression of the Irish revolt but also the outcome of Ochiltree’s
expedition to the Isles in the summer of that year. During the expedition, Ochiltree
established garrisons in the castles of Dunivaig and Duart and apprehended a
number of the leading chiefs, after which he brought them back to the Lowlands
and placed them in ward.79 By the end of the year, James had set up a commission
for the Isles whose aim was “to reasoun, advise, consult and deliberat upoun the
best, reddiest, and most spedie meanis how that bipast savaigenes and barbaritie
whiche hes bene of so long continewance in these boundis may be ruted oute,
and that civilitie, oure obedyence, and trew religioun (the onlie meane to preserve
77 Goodare, “Statutes of Iona,” 41, 51, 53; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 113; Macinnes, Clanship,
65–66.
78 Lee, Government by Pen, 79–80; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 112–13; Goodare, “Statutes of
Iona,” 47–48.
79 Report of Lord Ochiltree to the Edinburgh Council, 5 October 1608, RPCS, 8:173–75; Letter
from the earl of Argyll to the Edinburgh Council, 6 October 1608, RPCS, 8:741–42; Council minute,
6 November 1608, RPCS, 8:742. Hector Maclean of Duart, Lauchlan MacLean, brother of Hector,
Allan MacLean, son of MacLean of Ardgowan, Neil MacIlduy and Neil MacRory, dependents of
MacLean of Duart, were warded in Dumbarton Castle; Donald Gorm of Sleat and Donald MacAllan
MacIan, captain of the Clanranald, were warded in Blackness Castle; Alexander MacLeod, brother of
Rory MacLeod of Dunvegan and Harris, was warded in the Tolbooth in Edinburgh. Angus MacDonald
of Clan Donald South was allowed to remain at liberty with a promise he would appear before the
council on 15 November. Rory MacLeod of Dunvegan and Harris was yet to come in.
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bothe), may be planted.”80 While the king’s “Instructions” to the Commission
for the Isles of December 1608 “contemplated the expropriation or banishment
of at least some of the indigenous elite,” MacGregor argued, this “diplomatic
process yielded signs of encouragement.” The instructions asserted that as the
principal chiefs of the Isles were now in ward “thair can not be offerrit ony better
occasioun of capitulatioun with that sorte of people.” The “present oportunitye”
was “very remarkable,” and James went on to state that he was “unwilling to
extermine, yea skairse to transplant, the inhabitantis of the same, bot upoun a just
caus.”81
A period of negotiation followed in early 1609 between the commissioners and
the Islesmen, and, although some agreement was reached, it was not enough. In
spring 1609 Knox went to London to discuss matters with the king, and in June
1609 he received a commission to undertake another expedition to the Isles to
survey crown lands and bring in the chiefs that “are not yitt enterit” by offering
“libertie of saulff comeing and going without trouble and impediment, that so
by these means thay may be induceit to come in and mak assurance of all the
offeris that ar maid in thair name.” The chiefs currently imprisoned were to be
released “upoun sufficient pledgeis and bandis takin of foirfeyte of thair whole
landis yf thay do not observe every thing that is required of thame.” Knox sub-
sequently held court in August 1609 at Iona, where the statutes were negotiated.
He then appeared briefly before the council in September, after which he made
straight for London to present the outcome of his expedition to the king. In May
1610 James asked the council to proceed with the registration of the statutes,
which finally took place in July 1610.82
In order to support his view that the statutes represented a “temporary tidying-
up operation” rather than “a solution,” Goodare pointed to the lack of com-
munication concerning them that followed Knox’s submission to the king of the
statutes through to their registration, in the period between September 1609 and
July 1610. This was the result of the statutes, he continues, being “cast into
oblivion.” In contrast, MacGregor put forward a radically different interpretation.
He afforded Knox a pivotal role in advancing crown policy during this period
from August 1608 to August 1609, when it shifted from “colonisation or expro-
priation to . . . an unfolding scenario where chiefs were not merely secure if they
co-operated, but also enlisted to act on government’s behalf.” Thus, the statutes
were much more than a mere sticking plaster. Indeed, according to MacGregor
“Knox had hit the jackpot” and “far from departing from his brief, he had fulfilled
it beyond anyone’s expectations . . . the delay represents, not the consigning of
the statutes to oblivion and irrelevance, but their imminent presence.”83 Knox had
achieved more than James had hoped for. Numerous attempts had been made
80 Royal commission to certain members of the Edinburgh Council, 6 February 1609, RPCS, 8:
742–43.
81 James’s Instructions to the Lords Commissioners concerning the Isles, 6 February 1609, RPCS,
8:745; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 113–14.
82 Royal letter concerning the Isles, 27 June 1609, RPCS, 8:752–53; Royal letter to the Edinburgh
Council, 8 May 1610, RPCS, 9:16–18; Bond of Obedience from the Island chiefs to James, agreed
24 August 1609, registered 27 July 1610, RPCS, 9:24–26; Statutes of Iona, agreed 23 August 1609,
registered 27 July 1610, RPCS, 9:26–30; Goodare, “Statutes of Iona,” 37–38.
83 Goodare, “Statutes of Iona,” 41–42; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 113, 116, 119–20.
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previously to reach a workable agreement with the Highland chiefs, but they had
come to nothing. Now James could proceed realistically along the lines of co-
operation; but he needed time to reconsider how to implement this policy further.
James wanted to ensure that the implementation of policy in both regions would
be mutually beneficial. A negotiated agreement with the Hebridean elite would
help secure the success of his Ulster venture by limiting dislocation and curtailing
unrest, while plantation on such a scale as that planned for Ulster would ensure
no refuge could be offered to lawless Highlanders and Islesmen. There was no
blanket policy for Gaeldom.84 Instead, responsive to events as they happened and
ready to adapt as circumstances dictated, James progressed with a number of
different strategies for different parts of his kingdoms.85 The delay, therefore,
between Knox’s submission of the statutes in September 1609 and their registra-
tion in July 1610, was not the result of “indecision” or “neglect” but caution.86
Nor did James register the statutes “begrudgingly, through gritted teeth and
double-negatives.”87 Instead, the agreement that Knox reached with the Hebridean
elite, although unexpected, was very welcome, and James was optimistic about
pursuing a negotiated settlement. Extirpation and plantation had been on the
agenda for some time but had been envisaged for the most barbaric inhabitants
who resolutely refused to submit to royal authority.88 James had always hoped to
make his Scottish Gaelic subjects obedient to his authority, yet ongoing resistance
had encouraged James to take a firmer stance, implementing plantation in Lewis
and advocating further plantation in the western Isles.89 Although James would
84 Macinnes, Clanship, 57–59, discusses social and legal differences between Gaelic Scotland and
Gaelic Ireland.
85 Allan Macinnes, “Making the Plantations British, 1603–38,” in Frontiers and the Writing of History,
1500–1850, ed. Steven G. Ellis and Raingard Esser (Laatzen: Wehrhahn, 2006), 95–125, 104.
86 It is, perhaps, more than a coincidence that in May 1610, when James asked council to proceed
with registration of the statutes, land in Ulster was finally ready to be handed over to new owners.
Having been preoccupied with affairs in Ireland, James could now turn his attention back to the Isles.
87 MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 120.
88 James employed the policy of transplantation elsewhere in his three kingdoms. For the transplan-
tation of the Grahams from “the mid center of the hole Yland under our impyre” to Ireland, see Letter
from the London Council to Sir Arthur Chichester and the Irish Council, 30 April 1606, CSPI, 12:
462; Petition of Grahams, n.d. [1606?], CSPI, 13:50; Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London
Council, 21 February 1607, CSPI, 13:118; Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester and the Irish Council
to the London Council, 20 April 1607, CSPI, 13:140; Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London
Council, 23 June 1607, CSPI, 13:198; Letter from James to Sir Arthur Chichester, 16 July 1607,
CSPI, 13:222; Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London Council, 4 August 1607, CSPI, 13:
245; Letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London Council, 11 April 1608, CSPI, 13:471; Abstracts
of letter from Sir Arthur Chichester to the London Council, 4 July 1609, CSPI, 14:251. Others were
sent to the Netherlands to fight; see Ohlmeyer, “‘Civilizinge of those rude parts,’” 132.
89 Colin Kidd (British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World,
1600–1800 [Cambridge, 1999], 123–45) discusses the problematic and paradoxical attitudes of the
crown, the kirk, and wider Lowland society toward Gaelic Scotland. Indeed, Kidd argues that this
region “which in practice constituted the periphery of the Scottish nation . . . continued . . . to define
Scotland’s identity and the historical legitimacy of its institutions” (127), while James VI “showed no
reluctance to base his political theories on the ancient Scots” of the west. Thus, although Lowland
society refused to reject the origins of its Gaelic past, it continued to express hostility toward Gaelic
society, language and culture. See also Roger A. Mason, “Civil Society and the Celts: Hector Boece,
George Buchanan and the Ancient Scottish Past,” in Scottish History: The Power of the Past, ed. Edward
J. Cowan and Richard J. Finlay (Edinburgh, 2002), 95–119; Macinnes, British Revolution, 8–24, 40–41,
54–62.
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pursue plantation in Ireland, this was a response to the opportunity presented by
the Flight of the Earls and the O’Doherty rebellion. In December 1608 he had
counseled the commissioners of the Isles to “be moir cairfull for recovery of one
member of your awne body almost rottin and decayed” than for a “parcell of that
whiche, howevir pertening to this estate, yitt is no parte of this kingdome.”90
Reform of the Hebridean elite would see them integrated into wider Scottish
society both politically and, as the statutes emphasized, economically.91
Through his negotiations with the chiefs, Knox offered James the opportunity
to achieve what a few years previously had appeared unobtainable: the integration
of his Highland subjects into Scottish society.92 In May 1610 James acknowledged
that “the said Ilesmen, in a court haldin be the said Bischop at Icolmakill, have
bound thameselffis to performe dew obedience to us and our authoritie, and to
keip peace and quietnes in the cuntrey.”93 But the process that led the chiefs to
this position, much like the development of crown policy, was a long and contin-
uous one, and its roots lie back in 1607 and 1608. Considering the wider context,
it is not surprising that the chiefs reacted in the way they did and agreed to the
proposals put forward by Knox. In recent years they had witnessed the crown’s
repeated attempts at the Lewis plantation despite opposition from the MacLeods,
while the Clan Donald South faced displacement as the earl of Argyll acquired
legal rights to their lands. Coming to terms with the political situation in Scotland
meant acknowledging that crown intervention was not going to go away. Although
the west Highlands and Isles of Scotland had a history of royal intervention fol-
lowed by some degree of accommodation, events in Ireland raised the possibility
of an altogether different scenario. When the native elite in Ireland heard rumors
of impending crown action, they took leave and headed for the continent. Mean-
while, in Scotland the crown had made its attitude quite clear; the wording of the
commission given to Knox in 1609 was far from subtle: use “all kynd of hostilitie
yf thay continew rebellious and dissobedyent.”94 Ongoing opposition to the crown
looked distinctly unappealing.
While the fate of O’Neill and O’Donnell loomed over them, the Islesmen could
consider the example of Randal MacDonnell and recognize the benefits that came
from cooperation with the crown. Thus, since their alternatives were to be forced
from their land by the earl of Argyll, who had received a commission to extirpate
the Clan Donald, or to see their patrimonial lands planted like Lewis or Ulster,
the Highland elite were amenable and open to negotiation with Knox. Macinnes’s
reasoning that the “aversion of chiefs and leading clan gentry to collaborate with
Ochiltree and Knox was . . . remedied after brief gaoling in the Lowlands” is
90 James’s Instructions to the Lords Commissioners concerning the Isles, 6 February 1609, RPCS,
8:745.
91 Macinnes, Clanship, ix, 65–73; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 138–58, esp. 156.
92 Knox was later rewarded with the appointment to the bishopric of Raphoe in Donegal on 6–7
May 1610, again emphasizing James’s three-kingdoms perspective. If Knox could achieve such results
in the west Highlands and Isles, he would be a useful individual to have operating in the north of
Ireland during the plantation. See Ohlmeyer, “‘Civilizinge of those rude parts,’” 135. Ochiltree became
an undertaker in the plantation of Ulster, and was granted lands within Tyrone by James VI in 1610.
His son, Andrew Stewart, was created Baron Castlestewart by James in 1619.
93 Letter from James to the Edinburgh Council concerning the Isles, 8 May 1610, RPCS, 9:18.
94 Commission to Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles, 30 June 1609, RPCS, 8:756; McCavitt, Flight
of the Earls.
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perhaps too simplistic. So too is MacGregor’s explanation that a “constant factor
conditioning the behavior of the Hebridean elite since spring 1608 must have
been fear.”95 Certainly these were contributing factors, as was the fact that both
Ochiltree and Knox were from west coast families. Of utmost importance, however,
was the realization on the part of Highland chiefs that ongoing resistance to crown
policy would reap further ruthless, coercive government action. Because the
Highland chiefs were ready to negotiate terms and acknowledge royal authority,
in the resulting Statutes of Iona James achieved what he had originally intended:
not the removal of the clan elite but instead their assimilation into Scottish landed
society.96
Initial progress toward this assimilation made little headway until the suppression
of the Clan Donald South rebellion in 1615. In response, the Privy Council issued
a legislative package in 1616–17 that redefined and reinforced many aspects of
the statutes introduced through individual contracts with clan chiefs. Largely iden-
tified with the eighteenth century, the beginnings of a commercialized society
emerged in the Highlands in the early seventeenth century. However, for clan
society there were unforeseen by-products of the statutes. The obligation on chiefs
to appear annually before council and give account of themselves and their clan
meant extended visits to the Lowlands. This resulted in absenteeism and accu-
mulation of debt, while indebtedness encouraged dependence on lawyers to man-
age the chiefs’ financial affairs. Within the Highland region itself, the shift from
oral contracts to written leases clearly defined the terms of landholding. As chiefs
became more commercially oriented, land came to be viewed not as the patrimony
of the clan but as an economic resource to be exploited. Chiefs raised rents; they
no longer viewed tenants as clansmen and increasingly resorted to evictions of
those tenants who could not meet their demands. In the [Gaelic] oral tradition
this shirking of the traditional obligations of clan society was criticized.
The repercussions of the Statutes of Iona, therefore, were more far-reaching
than James could have envisaged. They had offered a means by which he could
eliminate certain characteristics of clan society while simultaneously bringing the
Highlands more into line with the rest of Scotland. Admittedly, throughout the
seventeenth century absentee monarchs became less concerned with implementing
reform in the region, but, in forging this agreement with the Hebridean elite,
James, far from being “the hammer of the Highlands,” showed himself to be a
traditional Stuart monarch, inclined rather more toward conciliation than
retribution.97
95 Macinnes, “Making the Plantations British, 1603–38,” 104; MacGregor, “Statutes of Iona,” 115.
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